Because “[a]n unlawful detainer action is a summary proceeding ordinarily limited to resolution of the question of possession[,] [citation] … any judgment arising therefrom generally is given limited res judicata effect.” (Malkoskie v. Option One Mortgage Corp. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 968, 973 [115 Cal.Rptr.3d 821].) The approach courts take to applying collateral estoppel in this setting is broadly consistent with that taken to the collateral estoppel effect given other forms of summary, informal or specialized adjudication.[5] As a general matter in such cases, collateral estoppel will only apply if the party to be bound agreed expressly or impliedly to submit an issue to prior adjudication (see Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 835) and had a full and fair opportunity to litigate (see Rohrbasser, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at p. 300) under circumstances affording due process protections (see Basurto, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 878).
In the specific context we have here, the two leading cases illustrating the collateral estoppel effect of unlawful detainer judgments are Wood v. Herson (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 737 [114 Cal.Rptr. 365] (Wood) and Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251 [142 Cal.Rptr. 414, 572 P.2d 28] (Vella). In Wood, the defendant (Herson) arranged to obtain a mortgage loan and purchase property allegedly on behalf of a couple who could not qualify for the mortgage (the Woods, one of whom was in bankruptcy). (Wood, at pp. 740-742.) A dispute arose over whether Herson held title and was the true property owner, or, as alleged by the Woods, held title in trust for them and had no right to possession. (Ibid.) Herson brought an unlawful detainer action, and the Woods defended by arguing fraud and claiming that, for a fee, Herson had 1328*1328 agreed orally to purchase the property on their behalf and then transfer title to them, but reneged. (Ibid.) They presented this theory through an affirmative defense of fraud. (Ibid.) Herson prevailed, and in a subsequent suit by the Woods for specific performance predicated on the same theory, the trial court granted summary judgment against them, applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel. (Id. at p. 739.) On review, the Court of Appeal affirmed. (Id. at pp. 747-748.)
The Wood court’s reasoning, as later described by the California Supreme Court in Vella, was as follows. “Noting that the Woods’ affirmative defense of fraud in the unlawful detainer action was virtually identical to the fraud allegations upon which their suit for specific performance was based, the court concluded that even though title `normally is not a permissible issue in an unlawful detainer action,’ the essential issues had been fully and fairly disposed of in the earlier proceeding. [Citation.] The court cited in support of its ruling such varied factors as the length of the `summary’ unlawful detainer hearing (seven days), the scope of discovery by the parties (`extensive’ and `complete’), the quality of the evidence (`detailed’), and the general character of the action (`[clearly] … not the customary unlawful detainer proceeding’). [Citation.] A lengthy and comprehensive superior court record replete with precise findings of fact persuaded the Wood court that application of collateral estoppel to curtail further litigation would involve `no miscarriage of justice — [the] Woods have had their day in court….'” (Vella, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 256, quoting Wood, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at pp. 740, 742, 745.)[6]
The Supreme Court adopted the same frame of analysis but reached the opposite conclusion on the facts in Vella, a case in which a property owner in an eviction action tried to block subsequent litigation against him by the evicted tenant based on the unlawful detainer judgment he obtained. There, the plaintiff, Nancy Vella, alleged she had a long-term “confidential” and “intimate” relationship with the defendant, Everett Hudgins. (Vella, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 253.) When Vella had trouble paying a note on a second deed of trust on her home, Hudgins purchased the note, told Vella he was doing so to protect her from default, and assured her she need not worry about making payments on the obligation. (Id. at p. 254.) The two then quarreled; Hudgins directed the deed of trust trustee to give notice of default; and in an ensuing unlawful detainer proceeding by Hudgins against Vella, Vella pleaded fraud as an affirmative defense, but ultimately lost and was evicted. (Ibid.) Nonetheless, she managed to persuade the trial court to allow her to litigate a fraud claim against Hudgins in a subsequent action, and she prevailed in a jury 1329*1329 trial. (Ibid.) On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected Hudgins’s contention that Vella’s separate fraud action was barred by res judicata. (Ibid.)
The Supreme Court distinguished Wood, describing it as an “uncommon” situation in which the parties to an unlawful detainer action had fully and extensively litigated issues beyond simple possession. (Vella, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 257.) The court acknowledged the Wood holding that “`full and fair’ litigation of an affirmative defense — even one not ordinarily cognizable in unlawful detainer, if it is raised without objection, and if a fair opportunity to litigate is provided — will result in a judgment conclusive upon issues material to that defense” (Vella, at pp. 256-257), but explained that the facts presented in Vella were more typical of a summary unlawful detainer proceeding than the situation presented in Wood. “The record offered in support of the plea of res judicata is virtually barren. Evidently the unlawful detainer proceedings were unrecorded or untranscribed, for no transcript of the municipal court hearing exists, and no findings of fact or conclusions of law were made, other than a notation in the trial judge’s minute order to the effect that Vella had not proved her affirmative defenses of `waiver and [equitable] estoppel and tender.’ The sparse record presented to us fails to show either the precise nature of the factual issues litigated, or the depth of the court’s inquiry. We decline to assume, given the summary character of this type of action, that the mere pleading of a defense without objection by the adverse party necessarily demonstrates adequate opportunity to litigate the defense. The fact that in the unlawful detainer action both parties submitted trial-length estimates of two hours, whereas trial of the second action consumed four days, while not controlling, does create a strong inference that the former proceeding was a conventional unlawful detainer action, unlike the elaborate and highly atypical proceeding considered in Wood.” (Vella, at p. 258.)[7]