“Extortion is the obtaining of property from another, with his consent … induced by a wrongful use of force or fear….” (Pen.Code, § 518.) Fear, for purposes of extortion “may be induced by a threat, either: [¶] … [¶] 2. To accuse the individual threatened … of any crime; or, [¶] 3. To expose, or impute to him . . . any deformity, disgrace or crime[.]” (Pen.Code, § 519.) “Every person who, with intent to extort any money or other property from another, sends or delivers to any person any letter or other writing, whether subscribed or not, expressing or implying, or adapted to imply, any threat such as is specified in Section 519, is punishable in the same manner as if such money or property were actually obtained by means of such threat.” (Pen.Code, § 523.)
Extortion has been characterized as a paradoxical crime in that it criminalizes the making of threats that, in and of themselves, may not be illegal. “[I]n many blackmail cases the threat is to do something in itself perfectly legal, but that threat nevertheless becomes illegal when coupled with a demand for money.” (Philippine Export & Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp. v. Chuidian (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1058, 1079, 267 Cal.Rptr. 457.)[13] The extortion statutes “all adopted at the same time and relating to the same subject matter, clearly indicate that the legislature in denouncing the wrongful use of fear as a means of obtaining property from another had in mind threats to do the acts specified in section 519, the making of which for the purpose stated is declared to be a wrongful use of fear induced thereby.” (People v. Beggs (1918) 178 Cal. 79, 83, 172 P. 152.) “It is the means employed [to obtain the property of another] which the law denounces, and though the purpose may be to collect a just indebtedness arising from and created by the criminal act for which the threat is to prosecute the wrongdoer, it is nevertheless within the statutory inhibition. The law does not contemplate the use of criminal process as a means of collecting a debt.” (Id. at p. 84, 172 P. 152; People v. Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th 935, 955, 987 P.2d 168 [In Beggs “we explained that because of the strong public policy militating against self-help by force or fear, courts will not recognize a good faith defense to the satisfaction of a debt when accomplished by the use of force or fear”]; Lindenbaum v. State Bar (1945) 26 Cal.2d 565, 573, 160 P.2d 9 [For purposes of extortion “[i]t is immaterial that the money which petitioner sought to obtain through threats may have been justly due him”]; Gomez v. Garcia (9th Cir.1996) 81 F.3d 95, 97 [“The law of California was established in 1918 that belief that the victim owes a debt is not a defense to the crime of extortion”].)
Moreover, threats to do the acts that constitute extortion under Penal Code section 519 are extortionate whether or not the victim committed the crime or indiscretion upon which the threat is based and whether or not the person making the threat could have reported the victim to the authorities or arrested the victim. (People v. Sanders (1922) 188 Cal. 744, 756, 207 P. 380; People v. Goldstein (1948) 84 Cal.App.2d 581, 587, 191 P.2d 102; People v. Hesslink (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 781, 787, 213 Cal.Rptr. 465.) Furthermore, the crime with which the extortionist threatens his or her victim need not be a specific crime. “[T]he accusations need only be such as to put the intended victim of the extortion in fear of being accused of some crime. The more vague and general the terms of the accusation the better it would subserve the purpose of the accuser in magnifying the fears of his victim, and the better also it would serve to protect him in the event of the failure to accomplish his extortion and of a prosecution for his attempted crime.” (People v. Sanders, supra, at pp. 749-750, 207 P. 380; People v. Massengale (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 758, 764-765, 68 Cal.Rptr. 415.)
Attorneys are not exempt from these principles in their professional conduct. Indeed, the rules of professional conduct specifically prohibit attorneys from “threaten[ing] to present criminal, administration, or disciplinary charges to obtain an advantage in a civil dispute.” (Cal. Rules of Prof. Conduct, rule 5-100(A).)
Extortion is not a constitutionally protected form of speech. (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992) 505 U.S. 377, 420, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (conc. opn. of Stevens, J.) [“Although the First Amendment broadly protects `speech,’ it does not protect the right to . . . `extort'”]; United States v. Quinn (5th Cir.1975) 514 F.2d 1250, 1268 [“It may categorically be stated that extortionate speech has no more constitutional protection than that uttered by a robber while ordering his victim to hand over the money, which is no protection at all”].)